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ABSTRACT. Some authors claim that hate speech plays a key role in perpetuating
unjust social hierarchy. One prima facie plausible hypothesis about how this occurs
is that hate speech has a pernicious influence on the attitudes of children. Here I
argue that this hypothesis has an important part to play in the formulation of an
especially robust case for general legal prohibitions on hate speech. If our account
of the mechanism via which hate speech effects its harms is built around claims
about hate speech’s influence on children, then we will be better placed to acquire
evidence that demonstrates the processes posited in our account, and better placed
to ascribe responsibility for these harms to individuals who engage in hate speech.
I briefly suggest some policy implications that come with developing an account of
the harm of hate speech along these lines.
I. INTRODUCTION: HYPOTHESIZING ABOUT HIERARCHY
The equal moral standing of all people, regardless of their social
identity, is an axiomatic commitment in liberal democratic thought.
And yet all liberal democracies have unjust de facto social hierarchies,
correlated with social identity categories like sex, race, and religion,
to some extent. By ‘de facto hierarchies’ I don’t mean arrangements
in which groups are officially disenfranchised or made into second-
class citizens. I mean systematic identity-based inequalities in mate-
rial resources, labor conditions, social mobility, and social influence –
inequalities which, in modern liberal democracies, exist alongside de
jure guarantees of civic equality. The larger questions behind this
paper are how to understand the causal forces involved in people
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being subordinated in these de facto hierarchies, and how the hier-
archies may be changed.1
When progressives today engage with these questions they often
pay considerable attention to communication. One example of this is
criticism levelled against satirists of the Charlie Hebdo type, arguing
that they’re not legitimate critics of religion, but accomplices in the
persecution of a racialized minority.2 Another example is the con-
siderable emphasis on ‘misgendering’ in transgender activism.3
These are two instances of a broader trend, in which progressives
attribute harmful power to communicative behaviors and then try to
police them. In response to this trend we see many critics
denouncing ‘political correctness gone mad’ and complaining about
the ‘regressive left’.4 And even if we are sceptical about the anti-PC
brigade’s complaints, we should grant that they are right about at
least one thing: many progressives in the 21st century have been
treating speech as a key battle-ground in campaigns for social
change.
Plenty of philosophers defend views that favor the idea that
communication plays a key role in perpetuating social injustice.
Consider philosophical contributions to the feminist anti-pornogra-
phy literature,5 or recent work on slurs,6 or stereotype threat,7 or
Butlerian analyses of how people’s performance of social identities
reifies cultural norms.8 I’m not saying that philosophers run as a pack
in their views on how communication supports social hierarchy, just
1 At various points in the paper I will use the term ‘subordination’ to refer to the process of people
being assigned an inferior position in these de facto social hierarchies. The question of how these
hierarchies operate, and what perpetuates them, is one that many scholars have examined. I am just
addressing one narrow class of hypotheses about the role of hate speech in this. Influential examples of
more general inquiries around this topic include Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or
Recognition? A Political Philosophical Exchange (London: Verso, 2003).
2 E.g. Anshuman Mondal, ‘Charlie Hebdo reinforces the very racism it is trying to satirise’, The
Conversation, 16th January 2016; theconversation.com/charlie-hebdo-reinforces-the-very-racism-it-is-
trying-to-satirise-53263.
3 E.g. Y. Gavriel Ansara and Peter Hegarty, ‘Methodologies of misgendering: recommendations for
reducing cisgenderism in psychological research’, Feminism & Psychology 24(2) (2014): 259–70.
4 One recent and prominent presentation of complaints along these lines comes in Greg Lukianoff
and Jonathan Haidt, ‘The coddling of the American mind’, The Atlantic 316 (2015): 42–53.
5 E.g. Rae Langton, Sexual Solipsism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
6 E.g. Renée Jorgensen Bolinger, ‘The pragmatics of slurs’, Noûs 51(3) (2017): 439–62.
7 E.g. Jennifer Saul, ‘Implicit bias, stereotype threat, and women in philosophy’, in K. Hutchison and
F. Jenkins (eds.), Women in Philosophy: What Needs to Change? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013),
pp. 39–60.
8 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (London: Routledge, 1990) is
the classic text.
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that many of them agree that communication is an important factor.
And this shouldn’t be surprising. Philosophical inquiry often focuses
our attention on the subtleties of language, and there is a temptation
in this mode of inquiry to assign language a position at the
explanatory center of everything. In short, plenty of philosophers are
fellow travellers with progressives who propose that communication
plays a major role in sustaining de facto social hierarchies.
Although we should treat this view seriously, we should be wary
of any over-confident or hyperbolic characterization of the causal
role that communication plays in de facto social hierarchy. The forces
that underpin social hierarchies are of course enormously complex. It
is hard enough to explain how the major economic elements of a
social order function: trade, jobs, housing, and the organisation of
business and government. Institutional practices (e.g. in policing, the
courts, schools, and workplaces) further complicate the picture, and
there are also private domains in which social arrangements are
largely shaped by informal norms and customs. With these other
factors in view, the cautious position would be to say that social
hierarchies aren’t sustained by communicative behaviors as such, but
by an interlocking network of policies, institutions, and material
conditions, which advantage some people and groups over others.
But then, given that sort of picture, there is room for doubt about
whether speech is making any distinctive and significant causal
contribution to social hierarchy. After all, it may be that when people
say racist things, for instance, this is largely an epiphenomenal
symptom of a deeper racist social order, whose etiology lies in other
material and institutional forces.9 And in response to this it isn’t
enough to simply assert that speech is doing the work. Our account
becomes speculative past the point of credibility if it suggests that
words can create social realities ex nihilo. We need hypotheses to
specify how, exactly, speech might be an operative factor in these
causal systems, and then credible evidence to substantiate those
hypotheses.
9 This kind of view doesn’t entail that speech is completely uninvolved in the causal processes
through which social hierarchies are sustained, just that the power of speech and communication,
where they are causally involved in these processes, is parasitic upon material and institutional factors.
As Pierre Bourdieu says, in this vein, ‘what creates the power of words… is the belief in the legitimacy
of words and of those who utter them’, and ‘words alone cannot create this belief’; ‘On symbolic
power’, G. Raymond and M. Adamson, (Trans.), in J. B. Thompson (ed.), Language and Symbolic Power
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991, p. 170).
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Among the different kinds of speech that might be seen as con-
tributing to social hierarchy, one that is often singled out for
attention is speech that overtly expresses contempt or disdain to-
wards people on the basis of their social group, e.g. speech that
essentializes groups with negative traits (‘all Muslims are terrorists’),
or uses slurs or dehumanizing terms to convey a view of the group
as disgusting, evil, or in some other way of lesser status. Like many
others, I will narrow my inquiry to this class of communicative
conduct. And I will use the term ‘hate speech’ to refer to it.10 In
narrowing my inquiry like this, I don’t mean to deny that other
forms of communication, apart from overt hate speech – like
everyday chatter in the home and workplace, or the stereotyping of
groups in the mainstream media – might play an important causal
role in sustaining social hierarchies.11 Indeed, given that these other
forms of communication are in certain ways more ubiquitous and
less avoidable than hate speech, and sometimes more subtle in
encoding identity-prejudicial views, they may sustain de facto social
hierarchies in ways that overt hate speech doesn’t or couldn’t
replicate. Nevertheless, much of the work that has been done by
philosophers and legal theorists around this topic focuses on the
effect of more overt forms of identity-prejudicial communication,
and that is where I will focus too.
More specifically, I want to examine the hypothesis that hate
speech contributes to identity-based social hierarchies by influencing
children to support or accept those hierarchies. This hypothesis isn’t
10 In this definition I am following James Weinstein and Ivan Hare. ‘In its purest form’ they say,
‘hate speech is simply expression which articulates hatred for another individual or group, usually based
on a characteristic (such as race) which is perceived to be shared by member of the target group’; see
‘General introduction: free speech, democracy, and the suppression of extreme speech past and present’,
in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.), Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009),
pp. 1–7, 4. Some authors define ‘hate speech’ in a way that also emphasizes the feelings that certain
speech characteristically elicits, and not just the feelings it expresses; e.g. Rae Langton, ‘The authority of
hate speech’, forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, Vol. 3. Alexander Brown has recently
argued that, on the understanding of the term ‘hate speech’ that is acquiring popular currency beyond
legal discourse, hatred needn’t be involved in hate speech in any respect, either in the attitudes it
expresses or elicits; ‘What is hate speech? Part 1: the myth of hate’, Law and Philosophy 36(4) (2017): 419–
68. Nevertheless, I take it that the class of communicative acts picked out by the definition that I have
given merits attention in its own right, in part because its members are the paradigmatic instances of the
kinds of speech that are regulated by the kinds of laws customarily identified as ‘hate speech regula-
tions’; for an overview of these, see Ivan Hare and James Weinstein (eds.), Extreme Speech and Democracy
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. xxxix–xlvii.
11 On everyday chatter, see Mary Kate McGowan, ‘Oppressive speech’, Australasian Journal of Phi-
losophy 87(3) (2009): 389–407; on media speech, see Jacob Rowbottom, ‘Extreme speech and the
democratic functions of the mass media’, in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.), Extreme Speech and
Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 608–30.
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entirely novel (see §II.A). What I am trying to do here is to build on
lines of inquiry that are suggested in the work of other authors, by
identifying certain merits in this kind of hypothesis that aren’t fully
recognized in the literature on this topic. I should acknowledge, at
the outset, that imploring others to ‘think of the children’ can
sometimes just be cheap, emotive bluster.12 But while it is important
to be mindful of this concern, we shouldn’t dismiss a prima facie
plausible hypothesis about the role of communicative factors in so-
cial hierarchy just because of its superficial similarity with moralistic
rhetoric. It is reasonable to ‘think of the children’ in a discussion
about the harm of hate speech, as long as we proceed cautiously.
The merits of focusing on hate speech’s influence on children
don’t really come into play if our question is just whether some
instances of hate speech are harmful to particular individuals. The
answer to that is uncontroversial. Token instances of speech that
expresses contempt towards people on the basis of their social group
can be used to harass, threaten, and incite violence. We don’t need
to be specially convinced that these instances of hate speech are
harmful, or that there is an in-principle justification for legally
restricting them.13 There is room for debate about what the right
regulatory approach is in this area, e.g. whether we should have
customized restrictions on hate-speech-as-harassment, or rely on
generic anti-harassment laws. But notwithstanding these open
questions, the real controversy over hate speech – and the contro-
versy to which my discussion in this paper is addressed – is not about
whether hate speech is harmful in specific instances, for people
whom it is used to directly and personally attack. The controversy,
rather, is about whether all instances of hate speech are implicated in
harming others, in a way that would give us an in-principle justifi-
cation for what I will call BANS, i.e. general legal prohibitions on hate
speech, which apply irrespective of whether the targeted speech is
12 Indeed, such rhetoric can be used to stir moral panics; see Marjorie Heins, Not in Front of the
Children: ‘Indecency’, Censorship, and the Innocence of Youth (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
2007). This is lampooned in episodes of The Simpsons where the shallowly pious Helen Lovejoy cries
‘won’t somebody please think of the children’.
13 Granted, this hasn’t always been true. One contribution of critical race scholarship on hate speech
has been to create a wider recognition of the threatening and harassing power of hate speech; see in
particular, the seminal collection Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence, Richard Delgado, Kimberlé
Williams Crenshaw, Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
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being used to harass, incite violence, or in any other direct way
threaten or harm people.14
It is true that in focusing on the case for BANS we are setting a high
bar for opponents of hate speech. One could argue that we have
grounds for thinking hate speech makes some contribution to social
hierarchy – one which justifies some form of legal response, like anti-
discrimination laws that disallow hate speech in workplaces – while
at the same time believing we lack the evidence we would need in
order to assert that all hate speech is harmful in a manner that would
justify BANS. Still, the question I intend to explore here is what it
would take to satisfy that more demanding standard of justification.
And this is part of what makes the focus on children relevant. If we
are aiming to develop an evidentially-supported defense of the thesis
that hate speech plays a significant causal role in sustaining social
hierarchies – one with the potential to underwrite an in-principle
justification for BANS – the hypothesis most likely to realize this aim
is one focusing on hate speech’s influence on children. Or so I will
argue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §II I survey some
of the existing work on hate speech’s influence on children, and I
discuss three conditions that an account of hate speech’s harm needs
to meet in order to provide an in-principle justification for BANS.
First, it should explain how all instances of hate speech make a
contribution to the postulated harm. Second, it should be the kind of
account for which it is possible in principle to acquire evidence that
substantiates the key claims about how this contribution occurs. And
third, it should explain how the person who engages in hate speech,
i.e. the ‘hate speaker’, can justifiably be ascribed responsibility for the
harm. In §III I discuss the advantages of focusing on hate speech’s
influence on children when formulating an account of its harm, in a
way that links up with these three conditions. I conclude in §IV by
sketching some of the policy implications that may follow if we
14 Authors who defend BANS include Anthony Cortese, Opposing Hate Speech (Westport Connecticut:
Praeger, 2006), Alexander Tsesis, ‘Dignity and speech: the regulation of hate speech in a democracy’,
Wake Forest Law Review 44(2) (2009): 497–532, and Jeremy Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 2012). Representative examples of authors who criticize BANS include
James Weinstein, ‘Extreme speech, public order, and democracy’, in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.),
Extreme Speech and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 23–61, and Eric Heinze, Hate
Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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account for hate speech’s harm in a way that emphasizes its influ-
ence on children.
II. WHAT IS NEEDED IN AN ACCOUNT OF HATE SPEECH’S HARM?
In scholarly writing that examines identity-prejudicial communica-
tion and the case for its regulation, we find a number of passing
comments on the negative impact that such communication can
have on children.15 There are only a few authors, though, who
explicitly claim that hate speech contributes to social hierarchy
specifically through its influence on children.
A. Existing Work on Hate Speech and Childhood
Delgado and Stefancic make this claim in Understanding Words that
Wound, a text that digests the key ideas in discussions about hate
speech from critical race theory. They devote a chapter to hate
speech’s bad influence on children, arguing that ‘much of the blame’
for feelings of inferiority among minority groups ‘rests with the
words and names children are exposed to while growing up’, and
that since children have fewer coping mechanisms than adults, they
are ‘particularly susceptible to the wounds words can inflict’.16 But
the evidence cited to support all this is not entirely convincing. For
instance, when Delgado and Stefancic say that much of the blame for
15 In his 1962 Presidential address to the American Political Science Association, Charles S. Hyne-
man derided the marketplace of ideas ethos in First Amendment theory, and said he couldn’t see ‘why
there is so little support… for governmental action designed to lessen or prevent the indoctrination of
children’ into racist views; see ‘Free speech: at what price?’, The American Political Science Review 56(4)
(1962): 847–52, 849. More recently, in arguing that pornography subordinates women, Rae Langton
suggests that a key issue is whether pornography ‘is authoritative for… the fifty percent of boys who
‘think it is okay for a man to rape a woman if he is sexually aroused by her’’; see ‘Speech acts and
unspeakable acts’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 22(4) (1993): 293–330, 311–12, my emphases. She also
discusses pornography’s influence on children by examining the findings of the 2013 Report of the UK
Office of the Children’s Commissioner, into adolescents’ views about consent; see ‘Is pornography like
the law?’, in M. Mikkola (ed.), Beyond Speech: Pornography and Analytic Feminist Philosophy (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 23–38. Jeremy Waldron is another influential scholar who alludes to
the impact of identity-prejudicial speech on children. He opens his book on the subject with the
following story. ‘A man out walking with his seven-year-old son and his ten-year-old daughter turns a
corner on a city street in New Jersey and is confronted with a sign. It says: ‘Muslims and 9/11! Don’t
serve them, don’t speak to them, and don’t let them in’. The daughter says, ‘What does it mean, papa?’
Her father, who is a Muslim… doesn’t know what to say’; see The Harm in Hate Speech, p. 1. For
Waldron, such episodes reveal hate speech’s raison d’être, which is to ensure that ‘for the father walking
with his children… there will be no knowing when they will be confronted by one of these signs’; see
ibid: 3.
16 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Understanding Words that Wound (Boulder: Westview, 2004),
pp. 93, 95.
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feelings of racial inferiority lies with the words and names children
are exposed to while growing up, they cite Delgado’s claim that
minority children ‘question their competence, intelligence, and
worth’ primarily because ‘they constantly hear racist messages’.17
The supporting citations for this come from classic social scientific
texts on racial prejudice from the mid-20th century, by Robert
Redfield, Gordon Allport, and Mary Goodman, and the evidence in
these texts just indicates that racist communicative practices are one
factor among others in generating racial stigma, not something to
which ‘much of the blame’ can be assigned.18
Cortese is another scholar who devotes particular attention to the
effect of hate speech on children. Drawing on Piaget’s develop-
mental psychology, Cortese claims that progress in the child’s cog-
nitive development consists in the expansion of her ability to
construct a ‘world-image’ through sympathetically identifying with
other people’s perspectives.19 On this picture, in-group and out-
group associations are ‘hardwired’ in our cognition, as a conse-
quence of this developmental process. And Cortese’s contention,
then, is that hate speech impairs the processes involved in the child’s
‘socioemotional’ development, in a way that ultimately leads to
identity-prejudicial attitudes in adulthood, which in turn contributes
to the perpetuation of identity-based social hierarchy.20 Again,
though, the evidence used to support these claims about the influ-
ence of hate speech is unpersuasive. The empirical studies that
Cortese cites indicate that prejudicial attitudes manifest in children’s
thoughts at alarmingly young ages. But evidence of these effects
doesn’t substantiate his key claim that hate speech is responsible for
them. Cortese’s attempt to link questions about hate speech’s effects
17 Richard Delgado, ‘Words that wound: a tort action for racial insults, epithets, and name-calling’,
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 17(1) (1982): 133–82, 146.
18 For instance, the text from Allport that they cite says that ‘plural causation is the primary lesson
we wish to teach’, and that economic exploitation and social structure are important contributors to
prejudice, and also that it is ‘a serious error to ascribe prejudice and discrimination to any single
taproot’; Gordon W. Allport, The Nature of Prejudice (Reading Massachussetts: Addison-Wesley, 1954), p.
xvi.
19 Cortese, Opposing Hate Speech, 144–45.
20 See ibid: 144.
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to developmental psychology adds an important element to the hate
speech literature, but it doesn’t vindicate the suggestion that hate
speech should be legally restricted because of its pernicious influence
on children.21
B. Causing and Contributing to Harm
As well as the limitations in the evidence they cite, the accounts
discussed above are partly orthogonal to our purposes, since they are
partly concerned with individual-level harmful effects of particular
instances of hate speech, which, as explained in §I, will not be the
focus of our inquiry here. But having said that, the authors cited
above are right to develop an account of hate speech’s harm in a way
that is responsive to empirical research in this area. And for reasons
that I will present and discuss in §III, these authors are also right to
focus on hate speech’s impact on children. It is worth doing a little
more background theoretical work, however, to clarify exactly what
is needed from an account of hate speech’s harm, if it is going to be
able to provide an in-principle justification for BANS. Having clarified
these criteria, we can use them to identify some of the advantages of
emphasizing hate speech’s effect on children.
In this I will be treating the harm principle as a necessary (but not
sufficient) condition on the permissible prohibition of speech. The
state cannot use the coercive apparatus of the law to prohibit speech
if its aim is to edify the speaker, or penalize bad speech per se, or send
a message condemning certain speech. If the state is going to pro-
hibit hate speech, it owes us (and the speaker) a rationale based on
the ultimate aim of preventing harms to others.22
How might one substantiate the claim, then, that all instances of
hate speech are harmful in a way that suffices to justify BANS – even
21 In a similar vein to the above, Brown surveys a range of claims made about the harms of hate
speech, including in critical race theory, and finds that in several cases authors cite empirical studies
which they say show that hate speech harms its targets, when in fact the cited studies show that
‘discriminatory treatment’ is the relevant causal factor, and don’t license the inference that hate speech
in particular (as a specific form of discriminatory treatment), is responsible for the relevant harms; see
Hate Speech Law: A Philosophical Examination (New York: Routledge, 2015), pp. 56–58. Further critical
discussion can be found in Heinze (see Hate Speech and Democratic Citizenship, pp. 125–29) of how legal
theoretic work in this area represents the findings of empirical research on the effects of hate speech.
22 Sunstein suggests that the prohibition of hate speech might be defended in terms of its ‘expressive’
function, the idea being that such laws send a message condemning the attitudes of the hate speaker;
Cass R. Sunstein, ‘On the expressive function of the law’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 144(5)
(1996): 2021–53. In assuming the harm principle I am ruling out any such justification for BANS.
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hate speech that isn’t used to threaten, harass, or incite violence, and
thus isn’t directly responsible for any particular harm being done to
any particular individual? The kind of claim one must defend here is
one that says all instances of public hate speech make a contribution
to some general state of affairs that is the cause of concrete harms to
particular individuals. Feinberg proposes a theoretical framework to
distinguish this kind of environmentally-mediated harm from harm
that is directly inflicted by particular acts. Where a ‘private harm
principle’ only allows prohibitions on directly harmful acts, he says, a
‘public harm principle’ would permit prohibitions on acts whose
restriction is necessary ‘to prevent impairment of institutional
practices and regulatory systems that are in the public interest’.23 Tax
evasion and contempt of court are Feinberg’s paradigmatic examples
of acts whose harmfulness is more aptly characterized by way of this
public harm principle. Even though isolated instances of tax evasion
don’t directly harm anyone, they are still genuinely harmful, he says,
‘insofar as they weaken public institutions in whose health we all
have a stake’.24
Joshua Cohen describes how environmentally-mediated harms
may be effected by speech in particular. Speech, he says, ‘may help to
constitute a degraded, sickening, embarrassing, humiliating… or
demeaning environment’, and when this is the case, although we
cannot ‘trace particular harmful or injurious consequences to par-
ticular acts of expression that… constitute the unfavorable envi-
ronment’, we can judge that individual speech acts are contributing
to the social environment’s degradation, and that specifiable harms
are resulting from this.25 This is the kind of account of hate speech’s
harm that one needs to provide in order to defend BANS: one on
which all instances of hate speech are contributing to a social envi-
ronment that harms people in targeted groups, or that weakens
institutions protecting their interests.
The type of environmentally-mediated harms that I am especially
concerned with, as I explained in §I, are those constituted by occu-
pying a subordinate position in an identity-based social hierarchy,
e.g. those that come with systematic disadvantages in resources,
labor conditions, or social opportunities. Another class of environ-
23 Joel Feinberg, Social Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 25.
24 See ibid: 25–26.
25 Joshua Cohen, ‘Freedom of expression’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 22(3) (1993): 207–63, 231.
ROBERT MARK SIMPSON88
mentally-mediated harms that one could focus on would be those
fostered by a ‘climate of hatred’ towards a group, ‘associated with an
increased chance of acts of discrimination, violence, [and] damage to
property’.26 Granted, the two kinds of harms may be causally
interrelated, insofar as climates of hatred can be produced by de facto
social hierarchies, and can reinforce those hierarchies in turn.27 But
there is a particular set of complexities associated with harms borne
of a climate of hatred that I don’t want my account to inherit –
specifically, complexities in how we conceive of the relations of
causation and responsibility that obtain between a speaker fueling a
climate of hatred, and someone under that climate performing an act
of violence or discrimination against a particular victim.28 By con-
trast, the harms generated by social hierarchy per se, are harms for
which, typically, there is no actor whose conduct is the proximate
cause of the harm – in other words, they are harms that are nec-
essarily conceived of as structural rather than agential.29 The kind of
account of hate speech’s harm whose prospects I want to focus on,
then, is one where the hate speaker is culpable for causally con-
tributing to a social order in which such structural harms are ef-
fected.
26 See Brown, Hate Speech Law, p. 67.
27 E.g. see Cecilia L. Ridgeway’s account of how, in a social order where one group gains a
positional advantage over another, recognition of the initially accidental disparity will be transformed
over time into a set of beliefs about the inferiority of the disadvantaged group; ‘The emergence of status
beliefs: from structural inequality to legitimizing ideology’, in J. T. Jost and B. Major (eds.), The
Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Inter-group Relations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 257–77.
28 Specifically, as Brown says, to substantiate this kind of rationale we won’t just need an eviden-
tially-supported account of how hate speech contributes to the degraded social environment, but also
evidence that the ‘climate of hatred’ makes proximately harmful acts (e.g. violence) against members of
target groups likely and imminent. There are reasons to doubt that the climate-to-act causal pathways
operate so straightforwardly, and practical difficulties in conducting studies that would demonstrate
these pathways if they were in effect; Brown, Hate Speech Law, 68–70.
29 In structurally harmful social hierarchies, as Iris Marion Young puts it, ‘in most cases it is not
possible to trace which specific actions of which specific agents cause which specific parts of the
structural… outcomes’; Political Responsibility and Structural Injustice (Kansas: The University of Kansas,
2003), p. 7. The idea isn’t that the harms are ultimately done to some amorphous entity, e.g. to society
per se, or to a social group abstractly conceived. The environmentally-mediated harms regulated by a
public harm principle still redound to individuals. What’s distinctive about them (and prevents their
regulation under a private harm principle) is that there is no direct causal link between perpetrator and
victim. Individual actors contribute to system-effects, and people’s interests are wrongfully setback by
those system-effects, but in a way such that we typically cannot attribute specific effects to specific
actors.
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C. Evidential Support
A harm-based rationale for BANS should be backed by evidence that
supports its claims about the causal processes through which hate
speech contributes to this kind of social order. Even if it isn’t the
legal theorist’s job to supply the data, she should not be indifferent to
whether and how evidence may be adduced in support of her con-
jectures. After all, as discussed in §I, there are other credible
hypotheses about the principal causal forces behind de facto social
hierarchy. It is easy to imagine hate speech as the culprit, because it
is the conspicuous facade of identity-prejudice. It is also an expressive
practice that is often the province of low-status speakers, who are
less skilled than elites in finessing their expression to avoid the
infringement of mainstream expressive customs. We can see that
deep, structural changes in employment and social mobility would
have a major impact on identity-based social hierarchies. But these
reforms are hard to achieve. Restricting hate speech is easier, partly
due to the limited social capital of the people BANS typically penalize.
But BANS would be patently illegitimate if they were essentially an
exercise in expedient scapegoating. For all these reasons, advocates
of BANS should not be content with a plausible-sounding just-so story
about how hate speech is playing a role in the perpetuation of social
hierarchy. They should want their story to be backed up by evi-
dence.30
There are ways of conceptualizing the harm that hate speech
inflicts that can notionally sidestep this demand for empirical sup-
port. Some authors appeal to conceptions of harm on which hate
speech doesn’t cause, but rather constitutes, a harm to its targets.
While there is a case to be made for this approach, it also has
limitations, insofar as it makes the truth of claims about hate
speech’s harm primarily hinge on esoteric normative and social-
30 There is a considerable, but disciplinarily disparate, body of empirical research investigating the
effects of hate speech, and it is unclear what (if any) sort of confident conclusions can be drawn from it
about hate speech’s distinctive role in perpetuating identity-based social hierarchies. One important
recent cluster of papers on this topic comes from a collaborative project between law and political
theory on the effects of hate speech and its regulation in Australia; see Katharine Gelber and Luke
McNamara, ‘Freedom of speech and racial vilification in Australia: ‘the Bolt case’ in public discourse’,
Australian Journal of Political Science 48(4) (2013): 470–84; Katharine Gelber and Luke McNamara, ‘The
effects of civil hate speech laws: lessons from Australia’, Law & Society Review 49(3) (2015): 631–64; and
Katharine Gelber and Luke McNamara, ‘Evidencing the harms of hate speech’, Social Identities 22(3)
(2016): 324–41. The most comprehensive synthesis and analysis of published empirical research relating
to the harm of hate speech, in the recent legal theoretic literature, is in Brown, Hate Speech Law (see in
particular footnote 28).
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theoretic theses, which lie outside the sphere of empirical arbitration.
Complex problems of legitimacy arise if our justification for BANS
appeals to an understanding of harm-infliction which rests on
philosophical conjectures that many in the polity reject (or would
reject, if the question arose). By contrast, if our claims about the
harmfulness of hate speech are based on the results of the application
of widely-accepted methods for assessing the impact of different
factors on people’s welfare and interests (defined in terms that are
standard to mature social scientific disciplines), then we will have an
especially robust justification for BANS – the kind that anyone should
recognize as legitimate, in principle, on pain of irrationality or
general scepticism. The call for evidential support, then, in debates
about BANS, is at least in part about seeing whether this decisive type
of justification for BANS is in the offing. This need not be motivated
by the prioritization of expressive liberty above all other considera-
tions, as some authors suggest.31
One might argue that the burden of proof should be reversed,
such that opponents of BANS have to provide evidence for the view
that hate speech doesn’t harm or endanger its targets.32 This sort of
precautionary approach gains prima facie plausibility from the his-
torical record of cases where hate speech seems to have helped to
fuel genocidal movements. If we have reason to think that hate
speech can contribute to catastrophic harms, in contexts where
identity-prejudice gives way to murderous atrocities, then we argu-
ably also have reason to think it can contribute to the routine harms
associated with identity-based hierarchies in relatively stable soci-
eties.33 On the other hand, there are several difficulties with the
appeal to precautionary justifications in this area. Precautionary laws
don’t eliminate risk as such, they just trade one set of risks (the risks
31 E.g. Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, 148.
32 Brown indicates some sympathy for a precautionary approach, e.g. he says an authority may
impose restrictions on certain instances of hate speech, ‘because having identified the possibility… that
a proportion of the individuals targeted by hate speech will not participate in the formation of public
opinion, and bearing in mind the conditions of uncertainty that surround these outcomes, it errs on the
side of precaution’; Brown, Hate Speech Law, 199.
33 For discussion of hate speech’s role in genocidal social movements, see Lynne Tirrell, ‘Genocidal
language games’, in I. Maitra and M. K. McGowan (eds.), Speech and Harm: Controversies over Free Speech
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 174–221. For discussion of how, even in stable democratic
societies, hate speech may contribute to a kind of ‘slow-burn’ incitement of anti-democratic movements
against marginalized groups; see e.g. Tsesis, ‘Dignity and speech’. Whether we can learn something
about hate speech’s likely impact in stable democracies, from observing its involvement in genocidal
movements elsewhere, is a complex question in its own right. One of Heinze’s core theses in Hate
Speech and Democratic Citizenship is that we cannot make ready inferences across this divide.
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of legal inaction) for another set.34 And in a liberal legal system in
particular, there will be a presumptive opposition to precautionary
laws that infringe against basic civil rights, insofar as such laws
themselves run the risk of allowing specious assertions about
imminent dangers to erode the rule of law and usher in authori-
tarianism.35 At any rate, whatever the best general defense of pre-
cautionary principles might amount to, a preventive rationale – that
adverts to the imminent aim of redressing the empirically demon-
strated harms of hate speech – gives us a stronger case for BANS than
a precautionary rationale. Once again, the aim here is to explore
whether that kind of particularly robust justification for BANS is in the
offing.
D. Responsibility for Harm
If one is seeking to defend BANS, the story one tells about the harm
done by hate speech needs to be one on which the hate speaker can
be ascribed responsibility for the harm. An example will help to
convey what I have in mind. Suppose someone were to argue as
follows.
Racial hierarchies, in-groups and out-groups, us and them: our penchant for social taxonomies
and rankings reflects the structure of language itself. Identity-prejudice is not due to particular
speech acts, but to the underlying grammars and vocabularies that frame all verbal communi-
cation. Language prefigures the discriminations that define social cognition, opening us up to
some people and closing us off to others.36
This picture identifies speech as responsible for causally contributing
to de facto social hierarchy, but it does so in a way which suggests
that social hierarchy cannot be meaningfully combatted by trying to
single out and counteract the effect of any particular speech acts. The
34 On this point see Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005). For a critical discussion of how precautionary rationales were
employed in Western democracies to legitimize ‘the war on terror’, and the semi-permanent shift to a
mode of governance based on ‘extraordinary emergency’, see Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster,
‘Governing terrorism through risk: taking precautions, (un)knowing the future’, European Journal of
International Relations 13(1) (2007): 89–115.
35 Just as historical cases can be cited to emphasize the risks of legal inaction, they can also be cited
to identify risks associated with infringing civil rights for the sake of addressing first-order risks, e.g. see
Geoffrey R. Stone, Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime from the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on
Terrorism (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004).
36 Although I’m not attributing this sketch of a position to anyone, the kind of linguistic con-
structivism that underpins it appears in some of Charles Taylor’s work; e.g. see ‘Theories of meaning’,
in Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985),
pp. 248–92, 263.
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problem with this picture is not the fact that it sees speech as
contributing to harms that are structural, indirect, or environmen-
tally mediated. As I explained in §II.B, this is precisely the type of
account of hate speech’s harm that we are looking to develop. The
problem here, rather, in the characterization of the mechanism
through which communication is harmful, is that it doesn’t enable us
to discriminate between instances of communication that are
contributing to harm, and instances whose effects are benign or
positive. On this picture all language-users collaborate in sustaining
social hierarchy, and there is little any of us can do to resist this.
In order to underwrite a credible justification for BANS, an account
of hate speech’s contribution to the structural harms of social hier-
archy cannot have this form. If we are going to punish individual
hate speakers, we need reason to think that they are responsible for
making a distinctive contribution to the harms of social hierarchy,
one that is different from – and more important than – the contri-
bution made by the listener or by the citizenry at large. There is little
justificatory payoff in an account that ultimately depicts hate
speakers as flotsam and jetsam, drifting around in a sea of deeper
forces that are the real drivers of social inequality.
We also need our account to support the notion that, where the
hate speaker contributes to harmful outcomes by influencing other
people, he can still be rightfully conceived of as responsible for con-
tributing to the relevant harms. At the same time, however, the
account we give must not have the upshot that in any context in
which B is influenced by A into u-ing, A can be deemed responsible
for contributing to whatever ensues from B’s u-ing. If our account of
responsibility for contributory harm was that inclusive – in societies
like ours, which have complex, multidirectional networks of cross-
cutting influences – it would too easily break down into an
implausible picture, on which everyone who speaks in public ends
up being partly responsible for contributing to a vast range of
downstream consequences. In short, in seeking evidence of the hate
speaker’s contribution to a harmful social order, we need to be able
to understand the speaker’s responsibility for that contribution in a
way such that he is at least partly accountable for actions performed
by the people he influences, but without making it the case that
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responsibility for harms which result from influencing others comes
too cheaply.
III. HATE SPEECH AND CHILDREN: EVIDENCE AND RESPONSIBILITY
I have argued that an account of hate speech’s harm must explain
how all instances of hate speech contribute to a harmful state of
affairs, and be amenable to empirical confirmation of its claims about
these effects, and show how hate speakers can be understood as
responsible for the relevant harms. In this section I explain the
advantages of focusing on children in developing an account of hate
speech’s harms that has the potential to satisfy these conditions.
A. The Legitimation and Normalization Hypothesis
As I explained at the outset, in §I, our hypothesis about how hate speech
contributes to unjust de facto social hierarchies, and their resultant harms
for members of targeted groups, must not downplay historical and
material factors. Our account becomes speculative past the point of
credibility if it suggests that words can conjure up social realities ex nihilo.
With this constraint in mind, the most credible type of hypothesis about
hate speech’s contribution to social hierarchy is one which posits that
hate speech legitimates and normalizes social hierarchies.
Several authors appeal to something like this in their discussion of
the relationship between speech and social hierarchy. In Matsuda’s
ground-breaking work on hate speech, she says the power of racist
groups ‘derives from their offering legitimation and justification for
otherwise socially unacceptable emotions of hate, fear, and aggres-
sion’.37 Parekh says identity-based social hierarchy is ‘legitimized by
a wider moral climate which is built up and sustained by… gratu-
itously disparaging and offensive remarks’.38 Among MacKinnon’s
charges against pornography, she says that it ‘authorizes and legit-
imizes’ sexual abuse.39 And Langton echoes this, arguing that al-
37 Mari J. Matsuda, ‘Public response to racist speech: considering the victim’s story’, Michigan Law
Review 87 (1989): 2320–81, 2378.
38 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory (New York:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), p. 314.
39 Catharine A. MacKinnon, ‘Francis Biddle’s sister: pornography, civil rights, and speech’, in Fem-
inism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987),
pp. 163–97, 171.
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though pornographers lack formal authority, they legitimate dis-
crimination against women by representing women’s subordinate
social position as ‘ordinary and normal’.40 If we are employing this
critical vocabulary in order to describe hate speech’s contribution to
a harmful social structure, then an initial version of our hypothesis
might be stated as follows.
The LAN (i.e. Legitimation and Normalization) Hypothesis: Hate speech causally contributes to
the harms of de facto social hierarchies by legitimating and normalizing systematic material and
institutional inequalities that track social identity categories.
What exactly does it mean to say that hate speech legitimates and
normalizes material and institutional inequalities? In particular, how
are social facts about what is legitimate affected by hate speech, if
most hate speech comes from people who lack any formal authority
to impose norms for others? One possibility, proposed by Ishani
Maitra, is that the hate speaker can acquire ‘licensed authority’. Like
the person who takes charge in a chaotic social situation and finds
that others fall into line behind his leadership, the hate speaker can
assume a kind of de facto authority, due to his contingent situational
influence rather than any recognized positional authority.41 It is
unclear, though, whether it would make sense to say that hate
speech ‘legitimates’ social hierarchy, if the hate speaker’s ‘authority’
to influence the social facts about what is legitimate is reliant upon
40 Rae Langton, ‘Subordination, silence, and pornography’s authority’, in R. C. Post (ed.), Censorship
and Silencing: Practices of Cultural Regulation (Los Angeles: Getty Research Institute for the History of Art
and the Humanities, 1998), pp. 261–84, 269. Langton’s work in this area is perhaps best known for the
way that it uses Austin’s speech act theory to explicate the claims that pornography subordinates and
silences women. But another integral element of her work is its development of the concepts of
legitimation and normalization, and the relations between them. As well as the above source, these
elements are at work in her 2015 Locke Lectures on ‘Accommodating Injustice’ (see philoso-
phy.ox.ac.uk/john-locke-lectures), and in other works of hers cited here, including ‘Speech acts and
unspeakable acts’, ‘Is pornography like the law?’, and ‘The authority of hate speech’. One aspect of
Langton’s development of these concepts is her emphasis on epistemic authority. The makers of
pornography don’t accidentally succeed in normalizing a picture of women as objects, and in causing
people’s beliefs to reflect that picture. Rather, she argues, pornography shapes the world such that
makes it (partly) true that women are what pornography represents them as; pornographers normalize
and legitimate women’s subordination, by expressing the epistemic authority they have as architects of a
patriarchal social order, and authoritatively transmitting knowledge of their design to others. This
aspect of her view is the focus in ‘Speaker’s freedom and maker’s knowledge’, in Sexual Solipsism, pp.
289–310.
41 Ishani Maitra, ‘Subordinating speech’, in I. Maitra and M. K. McGowan (eds.), Speech and Harm:
Controversies over Free Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 94–120. Note that McGowan
offers another kind of account of how social facts about what is legitimate can be altered by regular,
low-status speakers, based on the idea that speakers can verbally enact ‘conversational exercitives’
which (in the first instance) alter what is proper and improper conduct within the particular conver-
sation in which they are performed; e.g. see ‘Oppressive speech’. But it is a further question whether
this kind of account can be extended to explain how low-status speakers can alter legitimacy facts in a
further-reaching way, which affects the whole hierarchical ordering of a society.
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other people’s voluntarily acceding to his leadership.42 In light of this
concern, we can see why it makes sense to conceive of legitimation
and normalization as complementary processes. We are all subject to
powerful de facto social norms that enjoin us to act in accordance
with whatever practices and behaviors we understand to be
descriptively normal in the context where we are acting.43 The
conjecture, then, will be that when a person engages in public hate
speech, even if they do not possess any formal political authority,
they can represent the subordinate status of their targets as being
(descriptively) normal, and in so doing they can give identity-based
de facto social hierarchies the appearance of (normative) legitimacy.
To be clear, in stating that the LAN Hypothesis is a credible one, I
am not leaping to the conclusion that it is true. It remains for the
hypothesis to be assessed in light of relevant data, and as I will explain
in the next section, certain challenges are likely to arise in trying to
acquire evidence that demonstrates the specific process that the
hypothesis describes. Still, the hypothesis has two important features to
recommend it. First, it assigns a distinct role to hate speech in sus-
taining de facto social hierarchy, but – crucially – without denying the
primacy of the historical-material forces that underpin racial social
structures, patriarchy, and other identity-based social hierarchies. I
expect that almost no-one who is seriously engaged in these debates
actually believes that hate speech summons racism or heteronorma-
tivity into existence out of thin air. But it is easy to add rhetorical
flourishes in describing the causal powers of communication and, in so
doing, downplay historical-material factors. It is easy to say things like
‘words create the hierarchies and people fill them’,44 which are meant
to highlight the harmful potential of communication, but which
seemingly do this by attributing magical powers to speech. The LAN
hypothesis doesn’t make the influence of hate speech a rival explana-
tory hypothesis to one that emphasizes the historical-material bases of
social hierarchy. Rather, it posits that hate speech plays a key role in
cementing the conditions that historical-material forces set in place.
42 Given this account of what is occurring, a more fitting characterization might be to say that the
social hierarchy is being mutually enacted by speaker and audience together. For further discussion of
these kinds of cases, see Saray Ayala and Nadya Vasilyeva, ‘Responsibility for silence’, forthcoming in
Journal of Social Philosophy.
43 See footnote 45, below.
44 Shannon Gilreath, ‘‘Tell your faggot friend he owes me $500 for my broken hand’: Thoughts on a
substantive equality theory of free speech’, Wake Forest Law Review 44(2) (2009): 557–615, 604.
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The second advantageous feature of the LAN Hypothesis is that it
posits the operation of a phenomenon that is widely recognized and
which has been empirically observed, i.e. the phenomenon of nor-
malization. Whether the phenomenon is actually in effect in this
particular context – whether hate speech does in fact normalize
identity-based social hierarchies – is a further empirical question. But
the phenomenon of normalization itself isn’t merely some specula-
tive or conjectural critical concept. It is an empirically observed
phenomenon, of interest to researchers in a number of empirical
disciplines, including psychology and sociology.45
Given that I defined hate speech in terms of disdain and con-
tempt, one might note that the mere fact of someone expressing
‘disdain’ for a group wouldn’t necessarily represent that group’s
subordination as either descriptively normal or normatively legiti-
mate – at least, not for all values of ‘disdain’. If we are proposing that
hate speech legitimates social hierarchy, then, we need to interpret
‘disdain’ and ‘contempt’ for x as meaning something like ‘seeing x as
worthy of a subordinate position’.46 All liberal democracies subscribe
to some form of the doctrine that ‘human beings are born free and
equal in dignity and rights’.47 We encode this in our legal systems in
45 For starters, there is a large body of research on how norm-abiding behavior can be sustained by
people attending to environmental cues that indicate other people’s norm-adherence. One of the
seminal papers on this topic is Robert B. Cialdini, Raymond R. Reno, and Carl A. Kallgren, ‘A focus
theory of normative conduct: recycling the concept of norms to reduce littering in public places’, Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 58(6) (1990): 1015–26. These findings are part of the background for
contemporary philosophical work on social norms, e.g. Cristina Bicchieri, The Grammar of Society: The
Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). There is also
research in social psychology that indicates a connection between people’s understanding of what is
normal and legitimate, specifically with respect to social inequality; see Rui Costa-Lopes, John F.
Dovidio, Cícero Roberto Pereira, and John T. Jost, ‘Social psychological perspectives on the legitimation
of social inequality: past, present and future’, European Journal of Social Psychology 43(4) (2013): 229–37,
230. Recent work by Adam Bear and Joshua Knobe offers further support for the notion that things can
be made to seem legitimate by being represented as normal. Their key finding is that when people are
asked what they believe are the ‘normal’, ‘ideal’, and ‘average’ quantities of a variable (e.g. what fraction
of students cheat on exams) judgements about what is normal deviate from judgements about what is
descriptively typical, in a way that is influenced by judgements about what is ideal. Judgements about
what is normal and what is ideal are not independent, then – they interact and influence each other; see
‘Normality: part descriptive, part Prescriptive’, Cognition 167(1) (2017): 25–37. Some studies suggest that
children are especially disposed to form views about proper behavior based on observations of what’s
descriptively typical, e.g. Marco F. H. Schmidt, Hannes Rakoczy, and Michael Tomasello, ‘Young
children attribute normativity to novel actions without pedagogy or normative language’, Developmental
Science 14(3) (2011): 530–39.
46 Some authors make broadly similar points, about how the form of the ‘contempt’ that is con-
veyed in hate speech should be understood not in terms of a speaker’s negative emotion toward the
target group, but rather, in terms of the their speech’s ascription of a diminished status to the target, e.g.
Waldron, The Harm in Hate Speech, 34–37.
47 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 1.
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various ways, and in most liberal countries this enjoys majoritarian
support. Any form of discriminatory, identity-based mistreatment
should be straightforwardly recognizable as unjust in this kind of
formally egalitarian social milieu. But hate speech impairs the
recognition of this by making salient to its audience a representation
of its targets as second-class beings, who are quite rightly assigned a
subordinate social position. And all instances of public hate speech
make a contribution to the salience of these derogatory group rep-
resentations. In this way, so a proponent of the LAN Hypothesis
would suggest, hate speech helps people to see the disadvantages
faced by the target group as normal, natural, and legitimate, and it
thus deters efforts at reforming the wider structural hierarchies that
generate these disadvantages.
B. Evidential Support, Children, and the LAN Hypothesis
As discussed in §II.C, a harm-based rationale for BANS should be
backed by evidence that supports its claims about the causal pro-
cesses through which hate speech contributes to the harms of social
hierarchy. The natural question, then, is what evidence can be ad-
duced in support of the LAN Hypothesis? However, for reasons that
will become evident shortly, we actually need to delve into the
adjacent – more theoretical – question, of what evidence could be
unearthed and adduced in support this hypothesis, if it were in fact
true. I argued that the LAN Hypothesis is credible because it is
compatible with the highly plausible assumption that material and
institutional factors have causal primacy in the creation and per-
petuation of de facto social hierarchies. The LAN Hypothesis sees hate
speech’s role as bolstering those hierarchies by shaping people’s atti-
tudes in a way that favors them. But this picture of how the causal
factors work together creates difficulties if we are trying to eviden-
tially demonstrate hate speech’s effects. If hate speech’s influence
follows on from (and interacts with) other more fundamental causal
forces, then its distinctive effects will, in the normal run of cases, be
difficult to isolate and detect.
Consider the everyday bigot, A, who mostly keeps her prejudiced
views to herself, but is regularly exposed to hate speech in her daily
life. We want to see whether there is any evidence that this exposure
ROBERT MARK SIMPSON98
contributes to A’s view of the racial inequalities in her society as
normal and legitimate, as the LAN Hypothesis claims. But there is an
important rival hypothesis in the background. A’s entire life has been
spent in a society ordered by innumerable forms of racial inequality.
White people dominate the upper ranks in politics, business, law,
academia, the arts, and the military. Among the various ways in
which they are socially outranked by white people, black people
generally achieve worse outcomes in education and in other proxies
of intellectual ability. The complex historical and institutional forces
that explain these patterns are beyond A’s comprehension, and the
persistence of this social order confers upon it the appearance of
naturalness. By applying simplistic explanatory heuristics, A comes to
believe that the best explanation for the inequalities that she ob-
serves and experiences in her society is one that attributes some kind
of general inferiority in intellectual capacities to black people.
We can generalize from the uncertainty that this rival hypothesis
creates. Any study that aims to gauge the influence of hate speech on
adult subjects will have to examine individuals for whom this rival
hypothesis would be a prima facie plausible explanation of how they
came to regard identity-based social hierarchies as normal and
legitimate. In order to control for the factors that are emphasized in
this rival explanation, while gauging the influence of hate speech, we
would have to screen out the conditioning influence of a whole life
spent in the shadow of inequality. It may be relatively easy to devise
studies to test whether behavioral manifestations of identity-prejudice
can be activated through exposure to hate speech. But the evi-
dencing of this effect wouldn’t demonstrate that hate speech is
essentially involved in the formation of identity-prejudice. When
examining adult subjects who regard racial inequalities as normal
and legitimate, there are many other factors besides hate speech that
could plausibly be causally responsible for this, such that it is going
to be hard to acquire clear evidential support for any hypothesis that
purports to isolate the distinctive contribution of hate speech. The
confounding factors to be controlled for are too many, and too much
enmeshed with people’s everyday experiences of living in societies
like ours, to simply screen off. But now: consider a modified version
of the LAN Hypothesis, which adverts to hate speech’s influence on
children in particular.
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The CLAN (i.e. Childhood Legitimation and Normalization) Hypothesis: Hate speech causally
contributes to the harms of de facto social hierarchies by influencing children’s attitudes in a way
that legitimates and normalizes systematic material and institutional inequalities that track social
identity categories.
Studies that could find evidence in support of the CLAN Hypothesis
will be easier to devise and execute, in comparison to the LAN
Hypothesis. It is verging on impossible to find adult experimental
subjects who have been insulated from the wider social conditions
that might lead one to think of de facto social hierarchies as normal,
simply due to living a society in which they are normal. It will be
easier to find children who have been insulated from their society’s
overall conditions like this. Especially at pre-school ages, some
children live relatively cloistered lives, in which they don’t see the
material and institutional elements of identity-based social inequality,
or indeed, in which they don’t even encounter people from other
social groups. Obviously this isn’t true of all children. But it is true of
some children, and they may in principle become subjects for studies
aiming to isolate the influence of hate speech on people’s attitudes.
For example, suppose we take a four year-old, C4, living in an
ethnically homogenous community, and under appropriately con-
trolled conditions, we expose her to examples of hate speech against
a social group, G, that she and her family have no interaction with
and know little or nothing about. Suppose we then find, in follow-up
tests weeks or months later, that C4 starts manifesting a pattern of
negative attitudes towards members of G, e.g. she shows less distress
at the mistreatment of Gs compared to members of other groups. In
trying to explain this finding, there would be no reason to wonder
whether C4’s anti-G attitudes could be explained in terms of her
attempts to independently interpret the patterns of power and dis-
advantage that she has been observing in a social system where G’s
are structurally subordinated. Rather, we would attribute the change
in C4’s anti-G attitudes to the influence of hate speech, because there
would be no other good explanation as to what altered her attitudes.
If an accumulation of this kind of evidence were to indicate that
children take on identity-prejudicial attitudes as a result of exposure
to hate speech, this would provide evidence to support the
hypothesis that hate speech makes a distinct causal contribution to
the prevalence of attitudes, either conscious or unconscious, about
the legitimacy and normality of identity-based social hierarchies.
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The point that I am making here isn’t premised on the implau-
sible claim that in general, or in typical cases, hate speech is the main
factor (or the only factor) which influences children towards
accepting the normality or legitimacy of identity-based inequality.
For one thing, some children will absorb identity-prejudice through
exposure to relatively subtle manifestations of it in their family
members, in words and deeds. And we should also allow that in
most cases in which hate speech does play a key role in inculcating
prejudice in a particular child, the child’s attitudes, as she matures,
will typically be reinforced by other factors. More generally, it seems
plausible to suppose that for (most) children who acquire identity-
prejudicial attitudes, hate speech will just be one contributing factor
among others in this. My point here is about what kinds of things it
is possible to learn from observing hate speech’s effects on particular
child subjects, which it is not possible (to all practical purposes) to
learn from observing hate speech’s effects on particular adult sub-
jects. Individual child subjects are sometimes insulated in a way that
adults cannot be from the other confounding causal factors that can
influence people toward accepting the normality or legitimacy of
identity-based inequalities. Because of this it will be easier with
children than with adults to acquire evidence of any distinct influ-
ence that hate speech does have in normalizing and legitimating
identity-based social inequalities.48
C. Assigning Responsibility to the Hate Speaker
Here is a second reason why the modified CLAN Hypothesis is a
better foundation on which to build a harm-based justification for
BANS. Set aside my main contention in the previous section, for the
sake of argument, and suppose we acquired evidence that provided a
similar degree of empirical support for both the LAN and CLAN
Hypotheses. With regard to the CLAN Hypothesis, we would have no
48 We can imagine cases in which a child is exposed to speech that expresses contempt for groups
that don’t occupy a subordinate position in a de facto hierarchy, e.g. in a hypothetical egalitarian social
order where no groups occupy such a position, or in speech that is contemptuous towards privileged
groups. In such cases, the speech’s influence on the child wouldn’t contribute to the kind of structural
harms that I have been emphasizing. But it may still contribute to harmful outcomes, e.g. by influ-
encing the child towards performing harmful acts, or by undermining the child’s own self-respect. The
fact that we are focusing on hate speech’s contribution to structural harms, and how this might be
involved in making a case for BANS, is consistent with thinking we might have other kinds of harm-
based justifications for regulating hate speech in these other kinds of cases.
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reason to refrain from ascribing the hate speaker responsibility for
the identity-prejudicial attitudes inculcated by her speech. If an adult
influences a child’s attitudes, the adult bears responsibility for this
influence – both moral culpability, i.e. liability to be blamed, and legal
responsibility, i.e. accountability for resultant harm – if anyone does.
Of course there are complications and caveats around this, but in
general, children are not responsible for being influenced by adults
towards attitudes that result in harmful outcomes.
By contrast, when it comes to the LAN Hypothesis, the problem of
how responsibility should be ascribed is much more complicated.
And this is because adults are, outside of rare cases, like brain-
washing, responsible – that is to say, culpable, and where practical
stakes are involved, accountable – for their attitudes, even when
those attitudes causally stem from the influence of other people. If
person A’s communication has an influence on B’s attitudes, and if B
is a responsible agent, then in the normal run of cases, B – and not A
– is culpable and accountable for bad consequences that result from
B’s attitudes.49 Again, this is not the case with children. Children
don’t bear this kind of general responsibility for their mental lives
and how they respond to the influence of others: at least, not in the
same range of cases, nor to the same degree as adults. This is what
we standardly suppose, at any rate, both in our informal ethical
blaming practices, and as a matter of legal doctrine.50 All of this is
consistent with the point from §II.B, that A’s contribution to an
aggregate harm, x, suffices in principle to justify us in holding A
legally accountable for x. The point being made here is that there is
49 The idea here is that if you’re a normal adult, ‘you have a mind of your own’, and are thus
normally responsible for how you respond to other people’s influence; see Thomas Nagel, ‘Personal
rights and public space’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 24(2) (1995): 83–107, 96. This idea is integral to
several influential accounts of the grounds of the right to free speech (e.g. Thomas Scanlon, ‘A theory of
freedom of expression’, Philosophy & Public Affairs 1(2) (1972): 204–26); it is fully compatible with
recognizing exceptional cases, e.g. of provocation, in which normal adults have diminished responsi-
bility for how they are influenced by others (see L. W. Sumner, ‘Incitement and the regulation of hate
speech in Canada: a philosophical analysis’, in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (Eds), Extreme Speech and
Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 204–20, 215ff); and there are reasons to think its
structuring role in free speech theory can be retained despite the general limitations in our control over
our cognition (see Robert Mark Simpson, ‘Intellectual agency and responsibility for belief in free speech
theory’, Legal Theory 19(3) (2013): 307–30).
50 Here is how the point was stated in a landmark contemporary U.S. Supreme Court case
addressing issues around the capital punishment of adolescents. ‘Developments in psychology and brain
science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts
of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence… [Juveniles’]
actions are less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions of adults’.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), at 570.
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an exception to this general thesis about when we can ascribe
responsibility to people whose conduct contributes to aggregate
harms. If the mechanism via which A makes her contribution to x is
through communicative acts that influence another responsible
agent, B, to behave in ways that lead to x, then A’s contribution to x
isn’t sufficient to justify holding A accountable for x.51
One might worry that judgements about causation and culpability
are being run together in what I’m saying. Our interest in the causal
origins of social hierarchy isn’t only about who can be blamed. We
also want to understand the causal processes at work, independently
of who can be held accountable for them. Still, the disparities in
responsibility between adults and children aren’t only relevant here
with regards to questions of assigning blame. They also have a
bearing on how we characterize the causal character of these modes
of influence.
Imagine a case in which a teacher is indoctrinating his class of
primary-school aged children. Given the cognitive disparities, the
children will have limited ability to resist the teacher’s influence, or
to influence his attitudes in turn. Because of this it is plausible to
characterize the inculcation of attitudes in these children as a matter
of a certain agent, the teacher, acting upon a group of patients, the
children. By contrast, in a situation where a community of agents
with broadly comparable cognitive abilities are engaged in ongoing
communication with each other in a multidirectional network of
cross-cutting influences, it generally isn’t plausible to characterize
this as a process of certain agents acting upon certain patients. The
correspondence between this and the two contrasting versions of our
hypotheses should be clear. The CLAN hypothesis represents the
harmful effects of hate speech in a manner such that if the hypothesis
were substantiated, the hate speaker could straightforwardly be as-
cribed responsibility for causally contributing to the relevant harms;
the LAN hypothesis does not. Given how the LAN hypothesis repre-
sents hate speech’s contribution to the socially mediated harm, an
attempt to pin responsibility for this harm onto the hate speaker will
lead to an implausible over-attribution of responsibility, i.e. to nearly
51 Evan Simpson presents an analysis of the case for regulating hate speech which emphasizes the
responsibilities of listeners. On his view we can (or should be able to) expect listeners to be reasonable
in how they respond to the influence of hate speakers, and, roughly, this consideration problematizes
most kinds of legal regulation of hate speech; see ‘Responsibilities for hateful speech’, Legal Theory 12(2)
(2006): 157–77.
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everyone involved in the wider social ecosystem, or else it will
involve some sort of ad hoc confinement of responsibility to the hate
speaker alone.
These sorts of distinctions matter in the critical analysis of social
hierarchy. There are differences between acts of subordination per-
formed by particular agents, and processes of subordination that are
structural – differences in the underlying causal mechanisms, and in
how they can be counteracted.52 In the way that they try to coun-
teract identity-based social hierarchy, advocates of BANS aren’t just
recognizing and resisting structural injustices. They are trying to
pinpoint and counteract a specific contribution to structural injustice,
for which hate speech is allegedly responsible. If we are seeking to
vindicate that critical project, the CLAN hypothesis presents us with a
more viable characterization than the LAN hypothesis of the causal
processes involved in the perpetuation of unjust social hierarchy and
of hate speech’s role in that perpetuation.
IV. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Many progressives believe that communicative factors contribute to
de facto social hierarchy, and that hate speech plays an important role
in this, in a way that can justify BANS, at least in principle. In order to
substantiate these convictions and defend the restriction of hate
speech – even instances of it that aren’t used to threaten or harass
particular people – we need evidence that shows how all hate speech
contributes to the harms of social hierarchy, in a way such that hate
speakers bear some responsibility for the harms. The most promising
hypothesis, in seeking such evidence, is the CLAN Hypothesis: hate
speech influences children’s attitudes in a way that legitimates and
normalizes identity-based inequalities. Hate speech may influence
adults too, but it will be easier to acquire evidence of the mecha-
nisms of influence, and to hold hate speakers responsible for the
outcomes, if we focus on its effect on children. In arguing for these
merits of the CLAN Hypothesis, I don’t mean to suggest that no other
material, institutional, or communicative factors are involved in the
inculcation of prejudicial attitudes in children besides the influence of
52 To reiterate the earlier point from Young, the essential difference is that in structural processes of
subordination, ‘in most cases it is not possible to trace which specific actions of which specific agents
cause which specific parts of the structural… outcomes’; see Political Responsibility and Structural
Injustice, p. 7.
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hate speech. Our question was whether there is any distinctive
contribution that hate speech might be making to the structural
harms of identity-based social hierarchy, alongside whatever other
causal factors are involved in this. If hate speech is in fact making
such a contribution, and if we are looking for evidence of this in
order to provide an especially robust justification for BANS, then the
CLAN Hypothesis warrants particular attention.
The restriction of hate speech is an established part of most liberal
democratic legal systems outside the U.S. Those who want to see
this evidentially vindicated should be pursuing collaborative inquiry
with empirical researchers. If hate speech does contribute to social
hierarchy – all hate speech, even those instances of it that aren’t used
to harass, etc. – then systematic evidence of this should be attainable.
Cortese and Delgado and Stefancic gesture in this direction, but
there are limitations in the evidence they cite. Nevertheless, exam-
ining hate speech’s influence on children, as these authors do, is a
promising approach. There may be other kinds of arguments for
BANS, built around the aim of preventing harm to children, besides
the one that I have been exploring here.53 However, the most
credible case for restricting hate speech will be one that simultane-
ously substantiates the claim that hate speech contributes to identity-
based social hierarchies without implausibly downplaying the causal
primacy of material and institutional factors in underwriting social
structures. In order to develop and substantiate that case, we should
be asking whether there is evidence that exposure to hate speech
impacts children’s attitudes in a way that legitimates and normalizes
identity-based inequality.
For all I have said, one could still defend a hard-line free-speech
thesis, which would see BANS as illegitimate even if we did have an
evidentially backed account of hate speech’s harmful influence on
children. I won’t try to offer an assessment of this view of free speech
here, except to register one point. If our rationale for restricting hate
speech adverts to its influence on children, this allows us to sidestep
some prominent free-speech-based objections to BANS. Consider the
views of authors like Weinstein and Heinze, that freedom to engage
53 For example, if it is the case hate speech fosters a climate of hatred towards members of a
particular group, in a way that increases the incidence of acts of violence and discrimination against
members of this group (see footnotes 26 and 28), then it may be that children comprise a significant
portion of those harmed as a result of this.
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in hate speech is entailed by an essential condition of democratic
legitimacy54; or consider Baker’s view, that ‘the state only respects
people’s autonomy if it allows people… to express their own values’,
regardless of ‘how this expressive content harms other people’.55
These claims trade on the notion that it is illegitimate to impinge
upon people’s autonomy by trying to control what ideas they’re
exposed to. But this wouldn’t always be a reason to oppose content-
based restrictions on speech whose underlying justification was to
limit what kinds of messages children are exposed to. In short, the
kind of justification for restricting hate speech that I’ve been
proposing is better-placed than some other justifications to address
some free-speech-based objections.
I will conclude by briefly considering what the policy implications
might be if our primary justification for regulating hate speech is one
that adverts to its malign influence on children. One set of issues will
be about the policies governing social institutions involved in chil-
dren’s care, education, and socialization. We rightly expect these
institutions to shield children from hate speech, by adults and by
other children, although at higher levels we also expect social sci-
ences and humanities education to enable children to intelligently
reckon with the social reality of the attitudes animating hate speech.
Beyond this, schools may be the only institutions with any hope of
countering the influence of hate speech by parents to children in the
home, and in a society committed to reforming identity-based social
hierarchies, this is a pro tanto reason to think that overtly anti-dis-
crimination values should structure not only the institutional culture
of schools, but also certain parts of the curriculum. So far as that is
the case, it creates complications in religious educational institutions,
in which various kinds of identity-based prejudices – of a sexist,
homophobic, or aggressively religiously chauvinistic kind – are more
likely to be unofficially tolerated or inculcated as part of children’s
religious instruction. A serious commitment to shielding children
from the influence of hate speech shouldn’t suddenly lapse when
hate speech occurs under the banner of religious instruction. But
equally, regulatory bodies policing these requirements should strive
54 Weinstein, ‘Extreme speech, public order, and democracy’; Heinze, Hate Speech and Democratic
Citizenship.
55 C. Edwin Baker, ‘Autonomy and hate speech’, in I. Hare and J. Weinstein (eds.), Extreme Speech
and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 139–57, 142.
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for nuance and contextual sensitivity in deciding exactly where the
avowals of a devout conscience shade into hate speech.
The remaining question is how children’s exposure to hate speech
can be limited in public spaces generally, outside of institutional
contexts. In regards to this question it is useful to distinguish two
ways of imposing general legal restrictions on a given type of public
expression. Consider the difference between how Holocaust denial
laws function in some European states, and how laws function in
many states to regulate the public broadcast of adults-only enter-
tainment, including violent and sexually explicit cinema. In both
cases the legal restraints are general, in that they apply to instances of
the relevant communicative acts irrespective of whether, in any in-
stance, they are being used to harass or in some other way target
particular individuals. But obviously there is an important difference.
In properly regulated contexts, where measures have been taken to
constrain children’s access, it is permissible to broadcast adults-only
entertainment, whereas in jurisdictions with Holocaust denial laws,
there is no cordoned-off public arena where Holocaust denial is
permitted. It is prohibited regardless of whether it is expressed to
random people on the street or to like-minded allies in a clubhouse
for extremists.
If our case for restricting hate speech is linked to evidence of its
influence on children, then the policies enacted by BANS might bear
more of a resemblance to regulations governing adult entertainment
than to prohibitions on Holocaust denial. The primary aim of the
intervention would be to limit hate speech’s influence on children.
Of course it wouldn’t cancel out hate speech’s influence entirely.
Children occupy public spaces in various ways, and in different ways
at different ages. The way that children encounter extremist ideas
online is variable, and as long as the internet remains relatively free
and open, children will sometimes encounter hate speech on it,
whether by stumbling across it accidentally, or looking for it out of a
curiosity towards the hidden and illicit. But still, in contexts where
hate speech is protected children do encounter it in public spaces,
and there is at least a pro tanto case for limiting their exposure to such
encounters. Most legal systems still impose some age-based regula-
tions on the distribution of adult entertainment, in a way that reflects
the commonplace view that such material has a negative influence
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on children. And while the stakes might be higher (or at any rate
different) with hate speech, there is reason to think the aim of
removing hate speech from public spaces where children will be
susceptible to its influence is most effectively pursued by a regula-
tory approach that borrows from this policy area. This suggestion is
radical in that it proposes something different to the prevailing ap-
proaches in anti-hate speech law. But it is also mild in the sense that
it’s likely to be more agreeable to those who think that these pre-
vailing approaches run unacceptably close to being outright prohi-
bitions on certain forbidden opinions.
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